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
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22 April 1969

MEMORANDUM

1. This responds to the request for extrapolated data on Soviet forces for the 1974-75 period, assuming sustained high rates of expansion of major military missions.
2. The data are illustrative of levels that could be reached if the Soviets were willing to devote the resources to them and accept the penalties this would entail in other sectors of the economy.
3. These are not intelligence projections which involve balanced judgments on Soviet capabilities, requirements and intentions, but simple extrapolations of probable capabilities to continue to deploy more of the kinds of forces now in existence or now being built. If the Soviets were to exploit their capabilities to the fullest, were not concerned with stimulating US counteraction, and were willing to depress economic growth and living standards, forces of this order probably would be feasible.

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Strategic Offense

| <u>Heavy Bombers/Tankers</u> | <u>1969</u> | <u>1974</u> |
|------------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Bear | 105 | 200 |
| Bison | <u>80</u> | <u>70</u> |
| Total | 185 | 270 |

The figures for 1974 include the possibility of deployment of a new Bear with a new ASM in the 1970-71 time period, and low attrition rates for the Bison aircraft. Currently, the Soviets have no heavy bombers in production.

| <u>ICBMs</u> | <u>1969</u> | <u>1974</u> |
|-----------------------------|-------------|----------------|
| Total Operational Launchers | 1056 | 2500 (rounded) |

The figure for 1974 assumes that the SS-9 will continue to be deployed at a rate of six new groups (or 36 launchers) per year and the SS-11 at a rate of 15 new groups (150 launchers) per year, and includes current projections for deployment of the SS-13 in both the hard and mobile configuration. The total also assumes retention of all SS-7/SS-8 launchers.

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| <u>SSBNs / SLBMs</u> | <u>1969</u> | <u>1974</u> |
|---------------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Submarines* | | |
| H Class (3 launchers per boat) | 9 | 9 |
| Y Class (16 launchers per boat) | <u>7</u> | <u>46</u> |
| Total SSBN | 16 | 55 |
| Launch Tubes* | <u>1969</u> | <u>1974</u> |
| II Class | 30 | 30 |
| Y Class | <u>112</u> | <u>736</u> |
| | 142 | 766 |

Y-Class submarines are currently being produced at a rate of 6-8 per year. H-Class boats are not in production, but the Soviets are expected to retain all units through 1977.

*The figures represent total units in inventory. Boats on-line are generally about 80-85 percent of the total, and the Soviets are currently given the capability for maintaining about 30 percent of their force on-station.

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Strategic Defensive Forces

| <u>SAM</u> | <u>1969</u> | <u>1974</u> |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
| Launchers | 7600 | 9700 |

The 1974 number assumes that none of the older launchers (SA-1 and SA-2) are phased out as new launchers (SA-3 and SA-5) are introduced. It also assumes that deployment of the new systems will continue through 1974 at peak rates.

| <u>ABM</u> | <u>1969</u> | <u>1974</u> |
|---------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Launchers (Moscow System) | 48 | 64 |

ABM deployment activity is now limited to the Moscow system. If a follow-on long-range ABM interceptor is deployed by the 1973-75 time period, the number of launchers could be as high as 280 by 1974.

| <u>Interceptor Aircraft</u> | <u>1969</u> | <u>1974</u> |
|-----------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Number of Aircraft | 3600 | 4400 |

The 1974 number assumes that phase out of older aircraft is halted and that deployment of new systems (Foxbat, Flagon, and Fiddler) continues through 1974 at peak rates.

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Conventional Forces

| <u>Ground Forces</u> | <u>1969</u> | <u>1974</u> |
|----------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Manpower | 1.5 million | 1.8 million |
| Line Divisions | 164 | 189 |

The 1974 figures assume that the estimated rates of increase for 1968 and 1969 (generated in response primarily to China border problems and instability in the East European Satellites) continue through 1974.

| <u>Tactical Air Forces</u> | <u>1969</u> | <u>1974</u> |
|----------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Total Aircraft | 3400 | 4300 |

The 1974 figure assumes that phase-out of the older model aircraft now in the order-of-battle is halted. It also assumes that aircraft now believed to be in the last year or two of production continue in production through 1974.

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